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THE ITHACA INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS
N. David Mermin
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, U.S.A.
Notes for a lecture given at the Golden Jubilee Workshop on Foundations
of Quantum Theory, Tata Institute, Bombay, September 9-12, 1996
I list several strong requirements for what I would consider a sensi-
ble interpretation of quantum mechanics and I discuss two simple theo-
rems. One, as far as I know, is new; the other was only noted a few years
ago. Both have important implications for such a sensible interpreta-
tion. My talk will not clear everything up; indeed, you may conclude
that it has not cleared anything up. But I hope it will provide a different
perspective from which to view some old and vexing puzzles (or, if you
believe nothing needs to be cleared up, some ancient verities.)
I. Introduction: A Strategy for Constructing an Interpretation.
I’d like to describe some thoughts about what ought to go into a satisfactory interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics. I do this with considerable trepidation. “Ought to” can be a
highly personal business. And I have yet to put all the pieces together in a fully convincing
way. Those who feel they understand quantum mechanics may find what I have to say
boring and self–indulgent, while those who are bothered by quantum mechanics may find
what follows inadequate or even self–contradictory. So you may get nothing out of my talk
beyond a description of two elementary theorems. And one, and perhaps even both of the
theorems may be already known to you.
I offer this half baked concoction nevertheless because it seems to me the implications
of the theorems for the interpretation of quantum mechanics have not been emphasized
and deserve some serious exploration. I’ve been thinking about them on and off for about
half a year now, and have found, to my surprise, that they keep resonating in illuminating
ways with various aspects of the Copenhagen interpretation that have always struck me
as anthropomorphic or obscure. I have been getting sporadic flashes of feeling that I may
actually be starting to understand what Bohr was talking about. Sometimes the sensation
persists for many minutes. It’s a little like a religious experience and what really worries
me is that if I am on the right track, then one of these days, perhaps quite soon, the whole
business will suddenly become obvious to me, and from then on I will know that Bohr was
right but be unable to explain why to anybody else.
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So it’s crucial that I try to communicate some of these ideas before they become
so clear to me that only I can understand them. The problem, of course, is that my
fragmentary vision may be more of a pipe dream than a religious experience — not a
satori but a bad trip. I shall take that risk, and I ask for your indulgence.
I have a simple strategy for constructing an interpretation of quantum mechanics:
First of all, by “quantum mechanics” I mean quantum mechanics as it is — not some other
theory in which the time evolution is modified by non-linear or stochastic terms, nor even
the old theory augmented with some new physical entities (like Bohmian particles) which
supplement the conventional formalism without altering any of its observable predictions.
I have in mind ordinary everyday quantum mechanics.
I myself have never met an interpretation of quantum mechanics I didn’t dislike. I
shall try to extract something constructive from all these strongly held negative intuitions,
by prohibiting from my own interpretation all of the features I have found unreasonable
in all the various interpretations I have encountered. These prohibitions are listed as the
first five desiderata below.
To live with so many requirements I need room for maneuver. This is provided by
adopting, as my sixth and final desideratum, the view that probabilities are objective in-
trinsic properties of individual physical systems. I freely admit that I cannot give a clear
and coherent statement of what this means. The point of my game is to see if I can solve
the interpretive puzzles of quantum mechanics, given a primitive, uninterpreted notion of
objective probability. If all quantum puzzles can indeed be reduced to the single puzzle
of interpreting objective probabilities, I would count that as progress. Indeed since it is
only through quantum mechanics that we have acquired any experience of intrinsically
probabilistic phenomena, it seems to me highly unlikely that we can make sense of ob-
jective probability without first constructing a clear and coherent formulation of quantum
mechanics in terms of such probabilities.
II. Six Desiderata for an Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
Here are my own personal desiderata for a satisfactory interpretation. Most are based
on my persistent discomfort with various commonly held claims about the nature of quan-
tum mechanics.
(1) The theory should describe an objective reality independent of observers
and their knowledge.
The maddening thing about the wave–function is the way in which it manages to mix
up objective reality and human knowledge. As a clear indication of this murkiness note
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that even today there is coexistence between those who maintain that the wave–function
is entirely real and objective — notably advocates of Bohmian mechanics or seekers of a
modified quantum mechanics in which wave–function collapse is a ubiquitous real physical
phenomenon—and those who maintain, unambiguously with Heisenberg and presumably
with Bohr, that the wave–function is nothing more than a concise encapsulation of our
knowledge.
A satisfactory interpretation should be unambiguous about what has objective reality
and what does not, and what is objectively real should be cleanly separated from what is
“known”. Indeed, knowledge should not enter at a fundamental level at all.
(2) The concept of measurement should play no fundamental role.
I agree with John Bell.1 There is a world out there, whether or not we choose to poke
at it, and it ought to be possible to make unambiguous statements about the character of
that world that make no reference to such probes. A satisfactory interpretation of quantum
mechanics ought to make it clear why “measurement” keeps getting in the way of straight
talk about the natural world; “measurement” ought not to be a part of that straight talk.
Measurement should acquire meaning from the theory — not vice–versa.
The view that physics can offer nothing more than an algorithm telling you how
to get from a state preparation to the results of a measurement seems to me absurdly
anthropocentric; so does limiting what we can observe to what we can produce (“state
preparation” being one of the things you can do with a “measurement apparatus”). Physics
ought to describe the unobserved unprepared world. “We” shouldn’t have to be there at
all.
(3) The theory should describe individual systems — not just ensembles.
The theory should describe individual systems because the world contains individual
systems (and is one itself!) and the theory ought to describe the world and its subsystems.
Two attitudes lurk behind every ensemble interpretation. The first is a yearning (not
always acknowledged) for hidden variables. For the notion that probabilistic theories must
be about ensembles implicitly assumes that probability is about ignorance. (The “hidden
variables” are whatever it is that we are ignorant of.) But in a non-determinstic world
probability has nothing to do with incomplete knowledge, and ought not to require an
ensemble of systems for its interpretation.
1 Against ‘measurement’ , Physics World, 33-40, August, 1990.
3
The second motivation for an ensemble interpretation is the intuition that because
quantum mechanics is inherently probabilistic, it only needs to make sense as a theory of
ensembles. Whether or not probabilities can be given a sensible meaning for individual
systems, this motivation is not compelling. For a theory ought to be able to describe as
well as predict the behavior of the world. The fact that physics cannot make deterministic
predictions about individual systems does not excuse us from pursuing the goal of being
able to describe them as they currently are.
(4) The theory should describe small isolated systems without having to invoke
interactions with anything external.
Not only should the theory describe individual systems, but it should be capable of
describing small individual systems. We apply quantum mechanics all the time to toy
universes having state–spaces of only a few dimensions. I would like not only to be able to
do that, as I now can, but to understand what I am talking about when I do it, as I now
cannot.
In particular I would like to have a quantum mechanics that does not require the
existence of a “classical domain”. Nor should it rely on quantum gravity, or radiation
escaping to infinity, or interactions with an external environment for its conceptual validity.
These complications may be important for the practical matter of explaining why certain
probabilities one expects to be tiny are, in fact tiny. But it ought to be possible to deal
with high precision and no conceptual murkiness with small parts of the universe if they
are to high precision, isolated from the rest.
(5) Objectively real internal properties of an isolated individual system should
not change when something is done to another non-interacting system.
I agree with Einstein:2 “On one supposition we should, in my opinion, absolutely hold
fast: the real factual situation of the system S2 is independent of what is done with the
system S1, which is spatially separated from the former.” Indeed, I would take take spatial
separation to be just a particularly clear–cut way of establishing the absence of mediating
interactions between the two systems, and apply the supposition — generalized Einstein
locality — to any two non-interacting systems.
Einstein used his supposition, together with his intuitions about what constituted a
real factual situation, to conclude that quantum mechanics offers an incomplete description
2 Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist , ed. P. A. Schillp, Open Court, La Salle, Illi-
nois, 1970, p. 85.
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of physical reality. I propose to explore the converse approach: assume that quantum
mechanics does provide a complete description of physical reality, insist on generalized
Einstein–locality, and see how this constrains what can be considered physically real.
(6) It suffices (for now) to base the interpretation of quantum mechanics on the
(yet to be supplied) interpretation of objective probability.
I am willing at least provisionally to base an interpretation of quantum mechanics on
primitive intuitions about the meaning of probability in individual systems.
Quantum mechanics has taught us that probability is more than just a way of dealing
systematically with our own ignorance, but a fundamental feature of the physical world.
But we do not yet understand objective probability. Popper3 insisted that we cannot think
correctly about quantum mechanics until we learn how to think correctly about probability
as an objective feature of the world — that the interpretation of quantum mechanics had
never squarely faced this issue. I think he was right about that, but wrong in maintaining
that with his own formulation of objective probability he had cleared up the conceptual
puzzles.
I don’t have an understanding of objective probability any better than Popper’s, but I
maintain that if we can make sense of quantum mechanics conditional upon making sense
of probability as an objective property of an individual system, then we will have got
somewhere. Indeed, I doubt that we can hope to understand objective probability until
we have achieved the partial success of making sense of quantum mechanics, modulo such
an understanding. Quantum mechanics is our only source of clues about what objective
probability might mean, and we will only unearth those clues if we can succeed in making
sense of quantum mechanics from such a perspective.
So my attitude is this: Assume that some wise person has come up with an acceptable
notion of probabilities as objective properties of individual systems, and see if one can
sweep all the puzzles of quantum mechanics — what Popper called the muddle, mysteries,
and horrors — under that single accommodating rug.
In summary, these are my Six Desiderata for an interpretation of quantum mechanics:
(1) Is unambiguous about objective reality.
(2) Uses no prior concept of measurement.
(3) Applies to individual systems.
3 Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, New
Jersey, 1982.
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(4) Applies to (small) isolated systems.
(5) Satisfies generalized Einstein–locality.
(6) Rests on prior concept of objective probability.
To persuade you that my aspirations are not made entirely of fluff, let me next digress
to tell you about two elementary theorems of quantum mechanics that seem only recently
to have been noticed.
III. Two Elementary Theorems
I shall describe in a naive way two elementary theorems of quantum mechanics, which
bear on the interpretive problem. By “naive” I mean that I shall use uncritically terms for-
bidden by Desideratum (2) like “measurement”, “results of a measurement”, etc., because
they are a code we all understand, and because avoiding them would make the purely
mathematical argument much more clumsy. I shall return to more careful talk when I
discuss the relevance of these theorems for the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
To motivate the first theorem, consider the simplest possible quantum mechanical
system: a single two-state system, represented as the spin of a spin-1
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particle. Let this
system be described by the density matrix
W = 12 | ↑z〉〈↑z |+ 12 | ↓z〉〈↓z |. (1)
This density matrix has many alternative representations. among them being
W = 12 | ↑x〉〈↑x |+ 12 | ↓x〉〈↓x |. (2)
The first form is usually said to describe a situation in which the system is in the state
| ↑z〉 with probability 12 and in the state | ↓z〉 with probability 12 ; the second, a situation
in which the equally probable states are | ↑x〉 and | ↓x〉.
Is there an objective difference between these two situations? The statistics of all
possible measurements one can make are, of course, the same in both cases because the
density matrix is the same, but is there nevertheless an objective difference between a spin
with a definite but random polarization along z and a definite but random polarization
along x?
There is no agreement on this elementary conceptual point. People who take the
quantum state to be an objective property of an individual system would say there is a
difference: in one case this objective property is unknown, but is equally likely to be | ↑z〉
or | ↓z〉; in the other case it is either | ↑x〉 or | ↓x〉.
6
But if you accept Desideratum (5) there can be no objective difference. For one can
introduce a second two–state system that does not currently interact with the first, taking
the two systems to be in the singlet state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
| ↑z〉| ↓z〉 − 1√2 | ↓z〉| ↑z〉 (3)
which can equally well be written
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
| ↑x〉| ↓x〉 − 1√2 | ↓x〉| ↑x〉. (4)
The representation (3) of |Ψ〉 establishes that one can produce the situation suggested by
the representation (1) ofW by measuring σz on the non-interacting ancillary system, while
the representation (4) establishes that one can produce the situation suggested by (2) by
measuring σx on the ancilla. If objectively real internal properties of an isolated individual
system are not to depend on what is done to another non-interacting system, then there
can be no difference between these two realizations of the density matrix W .
This is the position of those who maintain that Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen correlations
and Bell’s Theorem establish only that there can be no local hidden-variables underlying
quantum mechanics, but do not establish that quantum mechanics itself implies non-
locality. I would like to explore where one can get by adhering to this view.
I once thought this peculiar situation — the ability remotely to produce either of
two apparently distinct realizations of the same density matrix W — stemmed from the
degeneracy of W . But this is wrong. Consider, for example, the non-degenerate density
matrix
W = p| ↑z〉〈↑z |+ q| ↓z〉〈↓z | (5)
with p 6= q, which in spite of its non-degeneracy also has many alternative representations,
one of which is
W = 12 |R〉〈R|+ 12 |L〉〈L|, (6)
where and |R〉 and |L〉 are the (non-orthogonal) states
|R〉 = √p| ↑z〉+√q| ↓z〉 (7)
and
|L〉 = √p| ↑z〉 − √q| ↓z〉. (8)
To make talking about things simple suppose that the probability p is very much larger
than the probability q = 1 − p. Then interpretation (5) of the density matrix describes
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a system that is in the state | ↑z〉 with high probability and in the state | ↓z〉 with low
probability, while the interpretation (6) describes a system that is with equal probability
in one of two non-orthogonal states representing spin along an axis tilted just slightly away
from z in either the direction x or −x.
Again one can ask whether there is an objective difference between these two ap-
parently quite different situations, and again the answer must be no. For one can now
introduce a second non-interacting two-state system with the pair in the state
|Ψ〉 = √p| ↑z〉| ↑z〉+√q| ↓z〉| ↓z〉 (9)
which can equally well be written
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
|R〉| ↑x〉+ 1√2 |L〉| ↓x〉, (10)
since | ↑x〉 and | ↓x〉 are explicitly
| ↑x〉 = 1√2 | ↑z〉+ 1√2 | ↓z〉,
| ↓x〉 = 1√2 | ↑z〉 −
1√
2
| ↓z〉. (11)
One can produce the situation associated with the representation (5) of W by measuring
σz on the non-interacting ancilla, while one can produce the situation suggested by (6) by
measuring σx on the ancilla.
It is the content of Theorem I that this state of affairs is completely general:4,5,6
Theorem I:
Given an arbitrary system described by a d-dimensional density matrix W , and given
N different interpretations of that density matrix in terms of ensembles of systems in
different (not-necessarily orthogonal) pure states, associated with the expansions
W =
Dn∑
µ=1
p(n)µ |φ(n)µ 〉〈φ(n)µ |, n = 1, 2, . . .N, (12)
then if D is the largest of the Dn there is a state |Ψ〉 in d×D dimensions and N different
observables An in theD dimensional ancillary subspace such that measuring the observable
4 N. Gisin, Helv. Phys. Acta 62, 363 (1989)
5 L. P. Hughston, R. Jozsa, and W. K. Wootters, Phys. Lett. A 183, 14 (1993).
6 See Appendix A for a proof that is more complete than Gisin’s, and conceptually more
straightforward than that of Hughston et al.
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An on the ancilla leaves the original d-dimensional subsystem in the state |φ(n)µ 〉 with
probably p
(n)
µ .
If you take Desideratum (5) seriously, then there can be no more objective reality to
the different possible realizations of a density matrix, then there is to the different possible
ways of expanding a pure state in terms of different complete orthonormal sets. This is not
to say that the “ignorance interpretation” of a density matrix does not provide a useful
technical way to deal with ensembles of systems. But in the case of an individual system
the density matrix must be a fundamental and irreducible objective property, whether or
not it is a pure state.
The case of EPR correlations has made familiar the fact that when a system is in a
pure state that is not a simple product over subsystems, then its subsystems can have no
pure states of their own. As far as I can tell, however, there is no consensus on whether
to take the subsystem density matrices as complete objective characterizations of their
internal properties. In view of Theorem I, Desideratum (5) requires us to do so.7
The second theorem also applies to EPR correlations, but will be used here in a much
more general context. To motivate it consider two spin-12 particles in the singlet state |φ〉.
Famously, their spin components are perfectly anti-correlated. In particular
〈φ|σ(1)µ σ(2)µ |φ〉 = −1, µ = x, y, z. (13)
There is a (less famous) coverse of (13):
If a system consisting of two spin-1
2
particles has a density matrix W , and if
trWσ(1)µ σ
(2)
µ = −1, µ = x, y, z, (14)
then W is necessarily the projection operator on the singlet state:
W =W0 = |φ〉〈φ| = 1− σ
(1) · σ(2)
4
. (15)
This is a direct consequence of the fact that W =W0 if and only if 〈φ|W |φ〉 = 1, but if W
satisfies (14) then
〈φ|W |φ〉 = trWW0 = trW
(1− σ(1) · σ(2)
4
)
= 14
(
1−
∑
µ=x,y,z
trWσ(1)µ σ
(2)
µ
)
= 1. (16)
7 Note that this same requirement, in a rather different context, alters the character
of the “quantum measurement problem”: if a pure state for the system–apparatus su-
persystem is entirely compatible with density matrices for each subsystem, then the von
Neumann “collapse” in a measurement is not from a pure state to a mixture, but from
viewing the subsystem density matrices as fundamental and irreducible, to viewing them
under the conventional ignorance interpretation.
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There is a way of looking at this trivial result that makes it a little surprising. Suppose
you have an ensemble of pairs of spin12 particles and you want to know if they all have
total spin zero. Total spin being a global property of the pair, one way to determine this
would be to measure the total spin of enough pairs to convince yourself that you are always
going to get the result 0. But suppose the pairs are so far apart that this is impractical.
There is another way. Two people can do a series of separate measurements of the two
x components to convince themselves that they are always anti-correlated, and then do
the same for the y and z components. In this way they can establish a global property
of an entangled state by a series of local measurements together with the exchange of
information about the results of those local measurements.
It is the content of Theorem II that this intriguing state of affairs is entirely general:8
Theorem II:
Given a system S = S1⊕S2 with density matrixW , then W is completely determined
by the values of trW A⊗B for an appropriate set of observable pairs A, B, where A = A⊗1
is an observable of subsystem S1 and B = 1 ⊗ B is an observable of subsystem S2. The
proof is as follows:9
Let theMi be a set of hermitian operators that form a basis for the algebra of operators
on the subsystem S1 and let the Ni be a similar set for S2. (If the state space for S1 is
given an orthonormal basis of states |ψµ〉 then the Mi could, for example consist of all the
operators |ψµ〉〈ψν | + |ψν〉〈ψµ| and all the operators i(|ψµ〉〈ψν | − |ψν〉〈ψµ|.) Since the set
of all Mi ⊗ Nj is a basis of hermitian operators for the algebra of operators on the full
system S, it follows that if |φ〉 is any state of S then the projection operator on φ has an
expansion of the form
|φ〉〈φ| =
∑
i,j
cij(φ)Mi ⊗Nj , (17)
where the coefficients cij are (real) numbers that can be explicitly calculated for any state
|φ〉 and any choice of the sets of operators Mi and Ni. So if W is the density matrix of S
then
〈φ|W |φ〉 =
∑
i,j
cij(φ)trW Mi ⊗Nj . (18)
Therefore one can determine any diagonal matrix element of the density matrix W of
an ensemble of systems S = S1 ⊕S2 from the correlations in the results of an appropriate
8 N. D. Mermin, Cornell lecture notes (unpublished), 1995. This must have been noticed
before, but I have not yet unearthed it in the literature.
9 I give the argument only for finite dimensional state spaces, leaving the extension to
the infinite dimensional case to those more mathematically knowledgeable than I am.
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series of measurements of observables specific to the subsystems S1 and S2. Since an
arbitrary off-diagonal matrix element can be expressed in terms of diagonal ones,
〈β|W |α〉 = 12 〈α+ β|W |α+ β〉+ i2 〈α+ iβ|W |α+ iβ〉 − 1+i2
(〈α|W |α〉+ 〈β|W |β〉), (19)
we can determine in this way all the matrix elements of the density matrix W in some
complete orthonormal basis for S, and hence determine W itself.
This proof easily generalizes to a system S = S1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Sn composed of more than
two subsystems: given any resolution of S into n subsystems, the density matrix of S is
entirely determined by the correlations among appropriate observables belonging to those
subsystems. In such cases the structure of quantum mechanics guarantees the important
fact that it doesn’t matter whether we pin down the density matrix, for example, of
S = S1 ⊕ S2 ⊕ S3 from correlations between observables of S1 with observables that act
globally on S2⊕S3, or from correlations between observables of S3 with observables acting
globally on S1 ⊕S2, or from tripartite correlations between observables acting only on the
three subsystems.
Thus the density matrix of a composite system determines all the correlations among
the subsystems that make it up and, conversely, the correlations among all the subsystems
completely determine the density matrix for the composite system they make up. The
mathematical structure of quantum mechanics imposes constraints, of course, on what
those correlations can be — namely they are restricted to those that can arise from some
global density matrix.10 The particular form of that density matrix is then completely
pinned down by the correlations themselves.
This is familiar in the case n = 1, where it reduces to the fact that the set of all mean
values over the entire system determines the density matrix. What seems to have been
overlooked, and what Theorem II establishes is the additional fact that for any resolution
of S into non-trivial subsystems S1, . . . ,Sn, it suffices to determine W to know those mean
values only for a set of observables restricted to those of the form A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗An where Aj
acts only on Sj .
In the context of the Six Desiderata, Theorem I asserts that the fundamental ir-
reducible objective character of an individual system is entirely specified by its density
10 That they cannot be more general than that is the content of Gleason’s Theorem. It
would be interesting to explore the extent to which the underlying structure of probabilities
assigned to subspaces of a Hilbert space on which Gleason’s Theorem rests is itself pinned
down by the requirement of consistency among different possible resolutions of a system
into subsystems.
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matrix, and Theorem II then tells us that the fundamental irreducible objective character
of an individual system is entirely specified by all the correlations among any particular set
of the subsystems into which it can be decomposed.
IV. The Ithaca Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
Having only begun looking at quantum mechanics from the point of view of my six
Desiderata and two Theorems, I have only scattered, incomplete conclusions to report. At
this stage the Ithaca Interpretation is rather fragmentary. Central to it is the doctrine that
the only proper subjects of physics are correlations among different parts of the physical
world. Correlations are fundamental, irreducible, and objective. They constitute the full
content of physical reality. There is no absolute state of being; there are only correlations
between subsystems.
Once it occurs to you to put it this way it sounds like a trivial point. For how could
it be otherwise? One might imagine a God existing outside of the World with direct
unfathomable Access to its Genuine Essence. But physics is more modest in its scope than
theology. It aims to understand the world in the world’s own terms, and therefore aims
only to relate some parts of the world to others. For physicists, if not for theologians, this
reduction in scope ought not to be a serious limitation.
If correlations are the fundamental, irreducible, objective components of physical real-
ity, and physical reality consists of individual systems, then probabilities are fundamental,
irreducible, objective properties of individual systems. For among the possible correlations
among subsystems are those between projection operators associated with the subsystems,
which have an immediate interpretation as joint probability distributions. This raises dif-
ficult questions about the meaning of probability for individual systems. As I noted at the
outset, the strategy of the Ithaca interpretation is to set aside such questions, not because
they are unimportant, but because the interpretation of quantum mechanics has enough
problems of its own. My aim is to find a satisfactory interpretation of quantum mechanics
contingent upon finding a satisfactory understanding of objective probability as a property
of individual systems. I would consider that progress.
The question that cannot be evaded, however, is correlations between what? I claim
that the failure explicitly to formulate and address this question or to give it only partial
answers, is responsible for many of the most notorious difficulties and anthropomorphisms
of the Copenhagen interpretation: the claim that the existence of a classical domain is
essential for a proper formulation of quantum mechanics; the intrusion at a fundamental
level of notions like observation, measurement, or state preparation, into what ought to
be a description of phenomena in the unobserved, unmeasured, unprepared natural world;
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and the murkiness of the distinction between objective fact and human knowledge.
To see how this comes about, note that if correlations between subsystems of a closed
system are indeed the only proper subjects for physics then the simplest closed non-trivial
quantum mechanical system is not a two-state system, but a four-state system, for a
two-state (or three-state) system cannot describe two non-trivial subsystems. What is
real and objective about such a four-state universe are only the correlations that exist
between the pair of two-state subsystems it contains. Observables of one subsystem have no
inherent meaning. They acquire such meaning as they have only from the character of their
correlations with observables of the other subsystem. If the entire universe consistented of
a two-site spin-12 Heisenberg model the complete objective facts about that universe would
be subsumed by the density matrix of that Heisenberg model — i.e. by nothing more or
less than the collection of all the correlations between the two subsystems. To ask about
the nature of the correlated quantities is to go outside of the universe, for it can only be to
ask how they are correlated with something else, and in this toy universe there is nothing
else.
And that’s all there is to it for a pair of two-state systems.11 Other toy universes are,
of course, more complicated, but what is real and objective about them is nothing more
or less than all the correlations among their subsystems. What’s real about the Universe
(if you insist on talking about the Universe) are the correlations among its subsystems.
These correlations constitute the totality of the internal objective reality of individual
systems. So what do measurement, or a classical domain, or knowledge have to do with
objective reality? Nothing — nothing whatever. They have to do with us.
We’re big complicated systems, and we’ve evolved under the pressure of having to
deal with other big complicated systems. We understand them, we can apprehend them,
and we’ve developed language, to represent them to ourselves or to help us tell each other
about them. But we did not evolve having to deal with simple two level systems or even
complicated atoms. So the only way we can cope with such systems, which evolution did
not outfit us to apprehend directly, is to arrange for them to be subsets of larger systems
containing subsystems of the kind we do know something about dealing with. We can
then learn about the objectively real correlations that exist between the small and the big
subsystems, and try to infer the nature of the systems inaccessible to our intuition from
how they correlate with the systems we’re equipped to deal with. The larger systems are
called “classical”, and the process of arranging to correlate them with the smaller systems
11 See Appendix B for some of the requirements even so simple a system imposes on the
character of objective probabilities.
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is called “the measurement process”.
In the measurement process as I’ve just described it, we ourselves play the role of God,
outside of the universe and directly perceiving these informative correlations. It’s really not
like that, of course. To put the point more accurately it’s necessary to acknowledge that
we ourselves are physical systems, and what actually emerges from a measurement are the
tripartite correlations between us, the classical subsystem, and the inaccessible subsystem.
It is because we have developed the ability to make sense of some of the correlations
between ourselves and classical systems, that we get something useful out of this process.
But this is a property of us — not of the inanimate physical world. Measurement, the
classical world, and human knowledge enter the picture only when we ask how we can
extract information about the correlations that constitute the world. The correlations
themselves, however, are there whether or not we take the trouble to learn about them.
The question of how we are able to understand correlations between ourselves and the
accessible “classical” systems we have arranged to correlate with the inaccessible “quan-
tum” systems is known as the problem of consciousness. It’s a very difficult problem —
much more difficult, in my opinion, than the interpretation of quantum mechanics. But it
is a problem about us. It is not a problem that has anything to do with what is objectively
real about those parts of the physical world that can be well isolated from us.
If the first pillar of the Ithaca Interpretation is that correlations are the only fun-
damental and objective properties of the world, the second is that the density matrix of
a system is a fundamental objective property of that system whether or not it is a one-
dimensional projection operator. To put it another way, in a nomenclature almost designed
to obscure the point, “mixed” states are as fundamental as “pure” states. This flies in the
face of much textbook talk about density matrices.
The problem, of course, is that density matrices can serve two purposes. One may
indeed be dealing with an ensemble of isolated systems, each of which has a one-dimensional
projection operator as its density matrix, and want to average over the ensemble the
internal correlations that prevail in each of the subsystems. The mathematical object you
need to do this has exactly the same structure, but not at all the same significance, as the
fundamental irreducible density matrix of an individual system. It is the latter density
matrix that fully describes all the internal correlations of one of the members of a single
EPR pair.
It remains to be seen whether this point of view toward density matrices can be
developed without running into trouble. It will be important that the development of the
Ithaca interpretation must be in a framework that makes it possible to formulate everything
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entirely in terms of internal correlations of isolated individual systems. My guess is that
this will be enough to make everything work. Certain common but obscure statements
about pure vs. mixed states already make straightforward sense in this new framework.
For example it is often said that the difference between a pure state and a mixed state is
that in the former case “we” have maximal “knowledge” about the system, while in the
latter case “we” do not “know” everything that can be “known”. The anthropomorphisms
disappear completely if one states this in terms of correlations between subsystems:
The density matrix of a subsystem S1 can be a one-dimensional projection operator
(i.e. a pure state) if and only if the only larger systems S = S1 ⊕ S2 that can contain S1
as a subsystem admit of no correlations whatever between S1 and S2. The absence of such
correlations is the objective fact. The anthropomorphisms simply express the consequences
of this fact for us, should we wish to learn about S1.
It is the program of the Ithaca interpretation to reduce all “quantum mysteries and
horrors” to such statements about objective probabilities of individual systems.
By not making it explicit that the pure state of a system (when it has one — and the
density matrix, when it does not) is nothing more than a concise way to summarize and
reveal the consistency of all the correlations among its subsystems, the Copenhagen inter-
pretation leaves a conceptual vacuum that is often filled with the implicit and sometimes
explicit notion that its pure quantum state is a fundamental and irreducible property of
a system under study, or even of the entire world. By conferring physical reality on the
quantum state one creates a major part of the quantum measurement problem. I am
not claiming at this point that granting reality only to correlations among subsystems
solves the measurement problem, but it certainly makes it harder to state just what the
problem is. Because everything you can formulate in terms of state vectors can also be
stated entirely in terms of correlations between subsystems — i.e. in terms of probability
distributions — if a quantum measurement problem remains it is going to be a problem
about the nature of objective probabilities of individual systems.
It is my optimistic expectation that by making the effort to reformulate the “measure-
ment problem” in those terms one will either demonstrate that it has vanished, or learn
something new and important about the nature of objective probability.
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Appendix A: Remote Construction of Arbitrary Ensembles
With a Given Density Matrix
Any density matrix W is hermitian and can therefore be expressed in terms of the
orthonormal (but not necessarily complete) set |φi〉 of its eigenvectors with non-zero eigen-
values:
W =
d∑
i=1
pi|φi〉〈φi| (20)
(with all pi > 0.) There are alternative ways to interpretW as distributions of pure states,
each of the form:
W =
D∑
µ=1
qµ|ψµ〉〈ψµ|, (21)
where D ≥ d, and the (normalized) states |ψµ〉 are not in general orthogonal.
The |ψµ〉 must span the same space as the |φi〉, since the spaces spanned by either set
have an orthogonal complement which is just the set of all |χ〉 with 〈χ|W |χ〉 = 0.
Consequently there is an expansion
√
qµ |ψµ〉 =
d∑
i=1
Mµi
√
pi |φi〉. (22)
Because the |φi〉 are an orthonormal set, for (20) and (21) to yield the same density matrix
W we must have
D∑
µ=1
MµiM
∗
µj = δij . (23)
If D > d we can extend M to a D-dimensional unitary matrix19 U with
Uµν =Mµν , ν ≤ d. (24)
It follows from (22) and the unitarity of U that
D∑
µ=1
U∗µν
√
qµ |ψµ〉 = 0, ν > d. (25)
We now define a state in the product of our original state space and a space of
dimension D:
|Φ〉 =
d∑
i=1
√
pi |φi〉 ⊗ |αi〉, (26)
19 This is simply the assertion that d orthonormal complex D-vectors Mµ1, . . . ,Mµd can
be extended to an orthonormal basis Uµ1, . . . , UµD for the entire D-dimensional space.
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where the |αi〉 are the first d members of an (arbitrarily chosen) orthonormal set |αµ〉,
µ = 1 . . .D.
It follows from (22) and (23) that
√
pi |φi〉 =
D∑
µ=1
√
qµ |ψµ〉M∗µi , (27)
and therefore
|Φ〉 =
D∑
µ=1
√
qµ |ψµ〉
d∑
i=1
M∗µi ⊗ |αi〉. (28)
Eq. (25) permits us to extend the sum to the entire set of D vectors |αµ〉:
|Φ〉 =
D∑
µ=1
√
qµ |ψµ〉
D∑
ν=1
U∗µν ⊗ |αν〉. (29)
We have thus arrived at an alternative form
|Φ〉 =
D∑
µ=1
√
qµ |ψµ〉 ⊗ |βµ〉, (30)
where
|βµ〉 =
D∑
ν=1
U∗µν |αν〉. (31)
It follows from the unitarity of U and the orthonormality of the |αµ〉 that the |βµ〉 are also
an orthonormal set.
If we are given a large number of alternative realizations of W of the form (21), we
can take the dimension of the auxilliary space to be the largest D associated with them.
The above argument then shows that if we are given any state |Φ〉 of the form (26), we
can find a representation of |Φ〉 having the form (30) for any of the many sets of |ψµ〉
satisfying (21). By measuring in the auxilliary space an observable whose eigenstates are
the associated |βµ〉, we can therefore produce an ensemble in the original space in which
the system is in the state |ψµ〉 with probability qµ.
Appendix B: The Hardy Paradox.
The simplest possible non-trivial closed individual quantum system — a pair of two
two-state systems — already gives some useful clues about some of the properties objective
probabilities will have to possess. The following example, invented by Lucien Hardy to give
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a particularly powerful version of Bell’s Theorem, also enables one to make an important
point about objective probabilities.
Call the two two-state subsystems A and B. To make the point we need consider only
two observables of each system, called 1A, 2A, 1B, and 2B. We can label the two eigenstates
of each of these observers by a color: red (R) or green (G). In each subsystem take the
eigenstates of observable 1 to be non-trivially different from those of observable 2 — i.e.
|1R〉 is a superposition of |2R〉 and |2G〉 with both coefficients non-zero. To make the
point it suffices to take the symmetric case in which the values of the two coefficients are
the same, whether the observables 1 and 2 are associated with subsystem A or subsystem
B. To keep the notation from getting too cumbersome we abbreviate the designation of a
state of the form |1AR〉 ⊗ |2BG〉 (for example) simply to |1R, 2G〉.
Now consider the universe consisting of the pair of two-state systems characterized by
the density matrix |Ψ〉〈Ψ| which projects on the (normalized) state:
|Ψ〉 = |2R, 2R〉 − |1R, 1R〉〈1R, 1R|2R, 2R〉√
1− 〈1R|2R〉4 . (32)
Clearly
p(1R, 1R) = |〈1R, 1R|Ψ〉|2 = 0, (33)
p(2G, 1G) = |〈2G, 1G|Ψ〉|2 = 0, (34)
p(1G, 2G) = |〈1G, 2G|Ψ〉|2 = 0, (35)
while
p(2G, 2G) = |〈2G, 2G|Ψ〉|2 = (1− x)
2x2
1− x2 = x
2
(1− x
1 + x
)
, (36)
where
x = |〈1R|2R〉|2 6= 0. (37)
The only important thing to note is that the first three of these probabilities are
zero and the fourth is non-zero, but I cannot resist noting that the probability p(2G, 2G)
happens to be maximum when x = 1/τ (where τ is the golden mean, τ =
√
5+1
2 ), in
which case the values of all the probabilities associated with the four pairs of subsystem
observables are as in the following lovely Table:
19
p 22 11 12 21
GG τ−5 τ−3 0 0
GR τ−4 τ−2 τ−1 τ−3
RG τ−4 τ−2 τ−3 τ−1
RR τ−1 0 τ−4 τ−4
The Hardy paradox consists of observing that the three 0 probabilities translate into
three conditional probabilities of unity:
p(1AG, 2BG) = 0 =⇒ p(2BG) = p(1AR, 2BG) =⇒ p(1AR|2BG) = 1, (38)
p(1AR, 1BR) = 0 =⇒ p(1AR) = p(1AR, 1BG) =⇒ p(1BG|1AR) = 1, (39)
p(2AG, 1BG) = 0 =⇒ p(1BG) = p(1BG, 2AR) =⇒ p(2AR|1BG) = 1. (40)
From these unit conditional probabilities we conclude that 2BG requires 1AR, that 1AR
requires 1BG, and that 1BG requires 2AR. Therefore 2BG requires 2AR:
p(2AR|2BG) = 1. (41)
But this contradicts the fact (36) that
p(2AG, 2BG) 6= 0. (42)
The conventional analysis of what’s wrong with this reasoning associates the proba-
bilities with the results of measurements. Thus the probability
p(1AR|2BG) = 1 (43)
appearing in (38) must actually be conditioned not only on getting G for a measurement
of 2B , but also on both measurements actually being performed. We should therefore use
the expanded form
p(1AR|2BG; 1A, 2B) = 1. (44)
The second 2B is unnecessary, if we interpret 2BG to mean property 2B is measured and
found to have the value G. It might appear that the second 1A is also unnecessary, but this
is incorrect. For the naive argument to go through, the 1AR in (38) must mean exactly
the same thing as it means in (39) — namely, property 1A is measured and found to have
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the value R. But the probability is not 1 that if 2B is measured and found to have the
value G then 1A is measured and found to have the value R. To get a probability of 1 we
must also condition on subsystem 1A actually being measured. Therefore we must rewrite
(38)– (40) as
p(1AR|2BG; 1A) = 1,
p(1BG|1AR; 1B) = 1,
p(2AR|1BG; 2A) = 1,
(45)
and the chain of reasoning following (40) breaks down.
This way out of Hardy’s paradox is not available to the Ithaca interpretation, which
insists that quantum mechanics should make sense as a description of the objectively real
correlations that exist in a universe consisting entirely of the two two-state systems. In such
a universe there are no measurements — only correlations. The additional conditioning on
an observable “actually being measured” has no meaning. In the Ithaca interpretation the
fallacy in the Hardy paradox can only be that the three “conditional probabilities” equal
to unity in (38)-(40) have no meaning. It makes no sense to contemplate the probability
that 1A is R given that 2B is G. The unconditional value of an observable for a subsystem
cannot be “given” — only correlations between subsystems have objective reality.
It therefore appears that the view of probability underlying the Ithaca interpretation
must be anti-Bayesian. At some fundamental level unconditional joint objective probabil-
ities have meaning, but certain conditional probabilities have no meaning, because that
upon which they are conditioned has no objective reality. Only correlations — i.e. only
joint distributions — have objective reality.
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